Author Archives: Jennifer Lynn

About Jennifer Lynn

Ms. Lynn is an associate of the firm. Her practice focuses primarily on construction litigation and landlord-tenant litigation, commercial disputes, and consumer rights.

UPDATE: Forfeiture Rule in Construction Disputes – Complete and Strict Performance Required for Design and Construction Claim, Otherwise Look to the Materiality Rule

By on June 29, 2018

Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) issued a decision in G4S Technology LLC v. Mass. Tech. Park Corp., SJC-12397, regarding the forfeiture rule for construction project contractor disputes.

Previously, the trial court in G4S entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing G4S’s breach of contract claim based on G4S’s intentional breaches of contract and its failure to strictly and completely perform all of the contracts terms. The trial court similarly dismissed G4S’s claim for damages under the theory of quantum meruit (which is an equity theory demanding the fair value of services performed or work completed), holding that an intentional violation of a contract was inconsistent with the good faith requirements of such theory. On direct appeal, the SJC considered whether Massachusetts should adopt an alternative standard to the forfeiture rule.

The SJC’s decision declines to extend the alternative standard, known as the “materiality rule,” argued by G4S in place of the Massachusetts forfeiture rule. The SJC reaffirms that complete and strict performance of the contract terms is required to recover on the contract itself. However, it further clarifies that the “complete and strict performance requirements” relate “only to the design and construction work itself” and “ordinary principles, including the traditional Massachusetts materiality rule, apply for breaches of other provisions.” The construction contract between G4S and Mass. Tech. Park was for the design and construction of a fiber networking system, meaning the contractual violations committed by G4S (submission of false certifications and withholding payment to subcontractors) do not concern that actual design or construction of the project and must be analyzed under the materiality standard, not complete and strict performance. Under this standard, the SJC still held G4S’s actions to be a material breach of the contract, stating that “paying subcontractors on time was an essential and inducing feature” between Mass. Tech. Park and G4S and “intentional misrepresentations to the government for financial gain are significant breaches of contact in and of themselves.”

With regard to quantum meruit claims, the SJC’s decision in G4S affirms that proof of substantial performance and good faith by the party seeking recovery is still necessary but overrules an older line of cases and holds “good faith now applies to the contract as a whole,” and “the intentional commission of breaches of individual contract provisions must be considered in the over-all context.” A simple standard cannot be applied to determine a ruling in equity; numerous factors must be analyzed to “balance the equities and produce a just result.” Such factors include the value of the uncompensated work, the damage caused by the breach, the total performance of both parties, and the balancing of equities to accomplish a just result. The SJC remanded G4S to the trial court for a determination of disputed facts and application of the clarified standard for quantum meruit recovery in construction disputes.

If you have questions concerning your rights in connection with a construction dispute, consult an experienced Massachusetts construction attorney.

Forfeiture Rule in Construction Disputes Under Review by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

By on March 6, 2018

Since the early 1900’s, Massachusetts courts have held that a contractor cannot recover on the contract itself without showing complete and strict performance of all terms or, in the event the contract cannot be completed fully, that the contractor substantially performed and attempted, in good faith, to perform fully. Under this rule, if the court finds that the contractor intentionally departed from the specifications of the contract, the contractor is prohibited from recovering under the contract, forfeiting its right to contract damages. 

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) will hear arguments this week requesting the forfeiture rule in construction cases to be overturned. The appellant in G4S Technology LLC v. Mass. Tech. Park Corp., SJC-12397, appeals a prior summary judgment ruling, wherein the trial court denied the contractor’s claims for approximately $10 million in delay-and-impact damages on the basis of the forfeiture rule. Despite ultimately completing the project, it was determined that the contractor paid some of its subcontractors late and submitted false certifications. Those actions were in breach the contract, and the trial court determined that those actions were sufficient to deny the contractor’s claims.

The SJC will consider whether Massachusetts should adopt an alternative standard that considers whether a breach was an uncured, material breach that alleviates the non-breaching party’s obligation to pay and weigh a breaching party’s lack of good faith or willfulness, among other factors to be considered by the court. This multi-factor analysis is applied currently by Massachusetts courts in other contract disputes, but not in connection with construction disputes.

Should the forfeiture rule be overturned, it would have wide-reaching consequences and create greater flexibility in arguing an entitlement to damages on breach of contract claims. Contractors would be wise to keep track of this case as it proceeds. If you have questions concerning your rights in connection with a construction dispute, consult an experienced Massachusetts construction attorney.

Understanding the Limitations of Chapter 93A: Pre-Litigation Attorneys’ Fees Not Recoverable

By on January 30, 2018

The Regulation of Business Practices for Consumer Protection Act, commonly referred to by its statutory chapter number, “Chapter 93A,” is a frequently utilized statute that provides individual consumers and businesses with a right to bring legal action and recover damages if they are harmed by an unfair business practice.  Under the statute, “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” or “unfair methods of competition” committed while conducting business in Massachusetts permit the harmed party to recover their actual damages, or a statutory minimum of $25 per offense (whichever is greater), and up to three times such damages for knowing and willful violations of the statute, plus an award for reasonable attorneys’ fees and the costs of the lawsuit.  Chapter 93A creates harsh penalties, with a wide-reaching scope, to deter unfair business acts, however, it does have limitations.

Previously, we explained the prohibition on Chapter 93A recovery with regard to a party’s decision to litigate a dispute, rather than settle with the opposing party.

A second limitation on recovery under Chapter 93A relates to the timing of when a party’s legal fees are incurred. Recently, the Suffolk County Superior Court considered the issue of whether pre-litigation attorneys’ fees are recoverable under Chapter 93A in Beninati, et al. v. Borghi, et al. The court awarded double damages to one of the plaintiffs under Chapter 93A. The defendants who were found liable under Chapter 93A then moved the court to reduce the attorneys’ fees award by $170,000 for fees incurred prior to the filing of the lawsuit, relating to “extensive settlement discussions.” The court agreed that pre-litigation fees are not recoverable under Chapter 93A, stating that it “is aware of no authority that permits the award of fees incurred before the litigation began and that do not bear directly on its preparation.”  Accordingly, the court excluded the pre-litigation attorneys’ fees from the award.

This case is just one example of the importance of understanding the process of litigating claims and the implications of dealing with an adverse party.  Depending on the circumstances of a dispute, it can be wise to initiate litigation sooner to ensure large portions of incurred attorneys’ fees are ultimately recoverable from the party causing the harm. To learn more about scope and application of Chapter 93A, contact an experienced Massachusetts litigation attorney.

Know Your Rights – Limitations on Retainage for Private Construction Projects

By on November 20, 2017

The Massachusetts Retainage Act limits the amount of retainage allowed for private construction projects, and imposes mandatory processes for reaching the date of substantial completion, submitting punchlists and completing punchlist items, and submitting applications for payment and obtaining payment of retainage.

The Act applies to all construction contracts signed after November 4, 2014, for privately owned projects where the original contract price with the owner is at least three million dollars and the general contractor, subcontractors, or design professionals would have mechanic’s lien rights , but exempts residential housing projects of one to four units.

Limit on Retainage

Under the Act, no more than five percent retainage may be withheld from any progress payment. Among other things, this prohibits frontloading retainage amounts for a portion of the project, with less held at the end.

Substantial Completion

The Act defines substantial completion as the stage in the project when the work required under the general contractor’s contract with the owner is “is sufficiently complete … so that the project owner may occupy or utilize the work for its intended use.” Substantial completion may apply to the entire project or to a phase of the project, but only where the project owner has expressly allowed substantial completion for defined phases.

In order to reach substantial completion, the general contractor must submit a form for notice of substantial completion, as contained in the Act, to the owner within fourteen days of reaching the stage when the general contractor believes the project is substantially complete. Then the owner has fourteen days to accept or reject the general contractor’s notice. Should the owner fail to timely respond to the notice, the owner is deemed accept to general contractor’s work as substantially complete.  If the owner accepts the notice, the date of substantial completion is set and is binding upon all related aspects of the contract. If the owner rejects the notice, it must notify the general contractor in writing of the rejection and include the factual and contractual basis for the rejection and a certification that the rejection is made in good faith. The Act permits an expedited process for the general contractor to dispute the rejection under the contract’s dispute resolution procedures. Alternatively, the general contractor can resubmit a form for notice of substantial completion to the owner for new approval.

Submission of Punchlists and Completion of Punchlist Items

Within fourteen days after acceptance (whether express or deemed accepted) of the notice of substantial completion, or the final and binding resolution of a dispute, the owner must submit a written punchlist “describing all incomplete or defective work items and deliverables” to the general contractor. The owner’s punchlist must be certified as made in good faith.

The general contractor has an additional week after the owner’s deadline expires, or twenty-one total days after acceptance, to submit a punchlist to each subcontractor from whom the general contractor is holding retainage “describing all incomplete or defective work items and deliverables required,” which may include items in addition to the owner’s punchlist. The general contractor’s punchlist to its subcontractors and suppliers must be certified as made in good faith. General contractors, subcontractors and suppliers are permitted to dispute punchlist items directed to them.

Submitting Applications for Payment and Obtaining Payment of Retainage

The general contractor, subcontractors and suppliers from whom retainage is held may submit written applications for payment of retainage no sooner than 60 days following the date of substantial completion.  Each contractor shall use the form required by their contract to apply for payment of retainage. Alternatively, the project owner and general contractor may allow for earlier submission dates. An application for payment of retainage must include the punchlist, along with a written list identifying which items have been completed, repaired or delivered, and a certification that the application is submitted in good faith.

Applications for retainage must be paid within thirty days of receipt, minus any withholdings described below. For each tier of contract below the prime contact with the owner, the time period for paying retainage is extended by seven days.

Should the owner or contractor seek to withhold payment of retainage, they are limited to (1) the value of incomplete, incorrect or missing deliverables as either agreed upon by the parties or, if no agreement is reached, no more than two and a half percent of the total adjusted contract price; (2) one hundred and fifty percent of the reasonable cost to complete or correct incomplete or defective work items; and (3) the reasonable value of claims and any costs, expenses, or attorneys’ fees incurred as a result of the claims (but only when permitted by the terms of the contract).

Retainage, or any portion thereof, cannot be withheld unless the party seeking payment receives, before the date payment is due, a written explanation “of the incomplete or defective work items and incomplete, incorrect or missing deliverables, the factual and contractual basis for the claims and the value attributable to each incomplete or defective work item, deliverable and claim.” The explanation of withholding must also be certified as made in good faith.

Moreover, the Act prohibits the owner from holding any portion of retainage due to subcontractors or suppliers that are not the subject of the owner’s claim against the general contractor, unless the owner has declared the general contractor in default under its contract.

As the foregoing makes plain, the Act requires all parties to a project to adhere to strict guidelines in connection with withholding, and later releasing retainage.  In order to gain a full understanding of how the Act and other statutes govern Massachusetts construction projects, and how to preserve your rights under those statutes, contractors would be wise to consult with a Massachusetts construction attorney regarding their specific contract and situation.

Home Improvement Contractor Denied Damages for “Reasonable Value” of Completed Work

By on October 18, 2017

Damages for work performed under a construction contract may be awarded under a variety of legal theories. One such theory is the principle of quantum meruit, which, when established, allows for an award of the reasonable value of goods or services as compensation for the value of “enrichment” those goods or services provide. Generally, one must demonstrate both good faith and substantial performance in order to recover on the theory of quantum meruit.

Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed an award of damages on a quantum meruit claim after homeowners terminated their contract prior to completion of work.

In Pinecone Construction, Inc. v. Sridhar, the trial court awarded quantum meruit damages to a contractor, reasoning that while the contractor’s work intentionally departed from the contract specifications, the work was “structurally sound” and was used in completing the project.  As a result, the court concluded that “equity demands” that the contractor recover the value of its labor and materials provided prior to termination. On appeal, the Appeals Court reversed, determining the trial court’s reasoning to be circular, and held that as a matter of law a contractor cannot recover quantum meruit damages without showing both good faith and substantial performance, without regard to any benefit or enrichment conveyed to the homeowners.  Because the trial court found the contractor’s intentional departure from contract specifications tantamount to bad faith, the damages award was overturned and the homeowners were separately awarded damages for the cost of completion and under the Massachusetts Home Improvement Contractor Act and Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 93A.

While Pinecone Construction is an unpublished opinion, it should stand as a cautionary tale to contractors – failure to perform work in good faith can bar even equitable recovery for work performed.  If you have questions regarding your ability to recover damages for your work on a home improvement contract or other construction work, you should contact an experienced construction lawyer to determine your rights and assess your potential remedies.

Recent Ruling Emphasizes the “Sacred” Procedure of a Jury Demand

By on September 11, 2017

     Parties to a summary process (eviction) proceeding in Massachusetts are afforded the right to a trial by jury. Article 15 of the Constitution for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts declares that “parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacred,” which applies to court rules and procedures for summary process governed by Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules, and Section 21 of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 185C.

     Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court overturned a ruling from the Housing Court and reemphasized the “sacred” right to a jury trial.  In Tchad Cort v. Alver Majors, a residential tenant appealed from judgment awarding possession and money damages to the landlord. The landlord filed a summary process action, to which the tenant responded with an answer, counterclaims, and a jury trial demand. At trial, the judge asked both parties if they were prepared for trial and the tenant acknowledged that he was prepared to proceed. After the landlord presented her case, the tenant provided testimony and stated that he would “like a jury.” The judge determined that trial was already underway and thus the tenant waived his right to trial. The tenant and the judge debated the tenant’s misunderstanding regarding waiver and the tenant presented his case. Thereafter, judgment entered against the tenant.

     On appeal, the Appeals Court reversed the judgment, holding that a passive waiver of a jury demand, by proceeding with trial without a jury after demanding a jury, is not sufficient to waive a prior plead jury demand. Instead, an effective waiver of a jury demand requires at least an oral stipulation waiving the demand. The Appeals Court emphasized the responsibility assigned to trial court judges to affirmatively investigate, prior to commencement of trial, whether to proceed with or without a jury, rather than starting trial and waiting for a party to object to the absence of a jury.

     Self-represented litigants in all courts are held to the same standards as attorneys. As a result, it’s crucial to understand and apply the rules of court and constitutional protections relevant to each action. More often than not, self-represented litigants are ill prepared to do so. In order to navigate litigation efficiently and effectively, engaging an experienced attorney to guide litigation prevents costly errors resulting from the failure to understand available rights and remedies. If you are involved in, or are considering filing a summary process claim, you’re well-advised to contact an experienced landlord-tenant attorney to achieve the best outcome.

Renting Apartments to Multiple College Students? Lodging House Requirements No Longer Apply

By on August 23, 2017

Massachusetts law distinguishes rented dwellings from lodging houses with regard to the requirements, rights, and remedies for the landlord or owner of the property and the tenants or lodgers. By statute, when a dwelling unit is occupied by “four or more persons not within second degree of kindred” to each other, that unit is considered “lodging,” and not a rental unit. In order to legally operate a lodging house, the owner of such units must obtain the necessary licenses, subject to fines or imprisonment for failure to comply.

The lodging house act was enacted during World War I as a reaction to concerns over immoral conduct and the spread of sexually transmitted infections. The Act divided persons who reside with their nuclear families, or are related within a second degree to the person owning the premises, from other, unrelated individuals who reside with each other. The Act applies to fraternity houses and dormitories for educational institutions, with the exception of dormitories for philanthropic institutions or nursing homes. Lodging houses have separate standards for complying with Massachusetts law, which are separate from standards set against apartment buildings and units. In addition to the licensing requirement, lodging houses must comply with the applicable building codes, they must provide kitchen facilities equal to or greater than 150 square feet in area and include a gas or electric plate or stove, a refrigerator, and hot and cold water, unless the city or town where the building is located has contrary regulations or bylaws. Lodging homes are also subject to the requirement that they not be used for any “immoral purpose” and the owner of the lodge must keep a register of all persons occupying units in the premises.

More recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) addressed the implications of the act in City of Worcester v. College Hill Properties, LLC, relative to private rentals to college students. In that case, the defendant property owners owned several two- and three-family properties and leased each unit to four unrelated college students under annual lease agreements. After investigating the units, the City of Worcester cited the defendants and ordered them to cease and desist from operating unlicensed lodging houses. The defendants refused to comply with the order and the City filed suit in the Housing Court. The Housing Court held that the units, as occupied, constituted “lodgings” under the law and ordered injunctions against the defendants. This ruling was upheld by the Massachusetts Appeals Court and the defendants ultimately appealed to the SJC. The SJC reviewed the historical differences between “lodgings” and apartments and analyzed the plain dictionary definitions to determine whether the defendants’ buildings were apartments or lodging. The SJC overturned the Housing Court’s ruling, finding that the City of Worcester’s interpretation of “lodging” (that the plain meaning of “lodging” and “let” suggested that the statute applies to “any place to live in any house”) was myopic and would “lead to absurd results and selective enforcement.” The SJC therefore refused to adopt the interpretation put forth by the City of Worcester and followed by the Housing Court, holding that the defendants were not operating “lodgings” within the meaning of the act.

The SJC’s interpretation in College Hill Properties has created a logical standard for distinguishing lodging houses from apartment buildings and has helped to facilitate the increased need for housing for college students in Massachusetts. If you are a property owner who rents to multiple unrelated persons or are considering renting in Massachusetts you should contact an experienced attorney to ensure compliance with all laws regulating rental apartments and lodging houses.

Property Owners and Landlords Beware: New Ruling Clarifies Restriction on Claims to Remove Holdover Owners and Tenants After Foreclosure

By on June 5, 2017

Every eviction action centers on one or both of the following issues: which party is entitled to possession and what amount of damages are appropriate. Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court faced a unique set of facts with regard to the right of possession in Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n v. Heather Gordon, et al., 2015-P-0441, and reaffirmed the requirement for post-foreclosure owners to resort to summary process to remove holdover owners and tenants.

In Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, the occupants of a property in Roxbury appealed from a judgment in favor of Fannie Mae, the party obtaining title to the property after foreclosure, from the Boston Housing Court. The occupants argued Fannie Mae’s common-law trespass claim against them was barred by statute and that Fannie Mae failed to obtain actual possession of the property before filing its claim. The occupants previously entered into a 3-year residential lease with one of the former owners of the property who lost title at foreclosure. Interestingly, the lease was executed after the date of foreclosure and after Fannie Mae filed a summary process action against the former owner. The former owner moved out of the property several months after signing the lease and the occupants moved in. Once Fannie Mae learned the occupants had taken possession, it brought a separate action for common-law trespass against them. The Boston Housing Court entered judgment awarding possession to Fannie Mae.

The occupants argued on appeal that Section 18 of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186 prohibits property owners from bringing common-law trespass actions against holdover former owners or tenants and requires resort to summary process to lawfully regain possession. The Appeals Court agreed with the occupants, reaffirming the Supreme Judicial Court’s holding in A.G. v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., 413 Mass. 284 (1992). The Appeals Court held that the former owner occupied the property at the time of foreclosure and that the occupants became holdover tenants. The Court went on to hold that the occupants’ status in relation to the property could not be treated as different or lesser than that of a holdover tenant without attributing actual or constructive knowledge that the occupants knew the former owner did not have title when signing the lease or when they moved into the property. The Court declined to create an expectation that residential tenants would need to take steps to make sure their landlord has title to a property before entering into a tenancy. Under the ruling set forth in Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, post-foreclosure owners may not bring a trespass action against holdover tenants who remain in possession, even where that holdover tenant’s leasehold rights arose after the date of foreclosure, but before final judgment for possession in favor of the foreclosure purchaser.

The Appeals Court also held in favor of the occupants’ argument that Fannie Mae never took actual possession of the property. Actual possession is one of the elements claimants must prove in order to succeed on a common-law trespass claim. In holding for the occupants, the Court reaffirmed the ruling in Dime Savings that actual or constructive possession by an owner asserting a trespass action cannot be maintained when the property is actually possessed by another. The Appeals Court clarified that “actual” possession does not terminate the minute the former owner vacates the property and that the facts presented in Nat. Mortgage Ass’n showed that the execution of the lease and surrender of possession to the occupants did not “indicate [the former owner]’s surrender of possession in relation to others [namely, Fannie Mae] who might claim title.” To the contrary, the facts suggest the opposite and that a gap in time between when the former owner vacated and the occupants took possession cannot signify surrender of actual possession by the former owner. The Court determined that surrender of possession is a factual dispute “to be determined by the intent as expressed by words and acts of all the parties in the light of the circumstances” and the facts presented suggested that the former owner intended to remain in possession after she moved out, regardless of the pending summary process action against her by Fannie Mae. 

The outcome of Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n further emphasizes the strict conformity Massachusetts require in connection within regaining possession and the necessity for landlords and residential property owners to undertake summary process to protect and enforce those rights. Evicting holdover tenants and former owners can be a complicated and fact-specific process.  As such, you should contact an experienced attorney to ensure the proper timelines and steps are taken to evict a tenant.

Purchasing At Foreclosure? Foreclosed owners may remain in possession longer under new Housing Court ruling

By on April 10, 2017

By Jennifer Lynn, Esq.,

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     The required timeline for notice of eviction to holdover former homeowners was recently altered by the Southeastern Division of the Massachusetts Housing Court in Lenders Comm. Finance LLC v. Pestilli, et al., docket no. 16H83SP03779BR.  After obtaining title, Lenders Commercial Finance brought a summary process action against the former-mortgagor who refused to vacate after receiving a 30-day notice to quit.  The bank moved for summary judgment, requesting the court to enter judgment in its favor because no facts were disputed between the parties and it brought a valid action to evict. In a departure from long-standing practice, the court ruled that Section 12 of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 186 requires service of a 90-day notice to quit in order to regain possession from the holdover former-mortgagor properly.  The court based the ruling on the fact that no agreement existed between the purchasing mortgagee and the former mortgagor to pay rent for any definite rental period. This ruling is a marked departure from the longstanding principle that a former-mortgagor, as tenant-at-sufferance, is only entitled to “reasonable” notice prior to eviction, and customary practice provided 30 days’ notice to the holdover occupant.

     The court’s ruling in Pestilli is an unpublished district court decision and stands only as persuasive authority for future summary process decisions. The ruling, however, may signal a shift in Massachusetts housing courts toward statutory interpretations that provide foreclosure occupants a longer period of notice before the mortgagee regains possession of foreclosed property. Should the standards set forth in this ruling be adopted widely, the timeline for eviction will be extended, creating additional burdens for the foreclosure purchaser and increased overall costs. In addition, the change will likely create an increase in “cash for keys” deals, under which the purchaser offers a deal to the former-mortgagor to vacate voluntarily and to forego challenging the right to possession. Evicting holdover tenants and former homeowners can be a complicated and fact-specific process. As such, you should contact an experienced attorney to ensure the proper timelines and grounds for eviction are present.

Proposed Legislation to Restrict Reasons for Evicting Tenants in Boston

By on January 31, 2017

Mayor Walsh’s administration recently proposed a new bill aimed at limiting the available reasons to evict a residential tenant. The proposal, known as the “Jim Brooks Community Stabilization Act,” would eliminate no-fault evictions in many instances, a common practice used to remove tenants without listing a violation. Proponents of the act claim that it is designed to protect renters from “arbitrary” or unreasonable evictions, without unfairly restricting the landlord. Opponents cite concerns that it would deter further development and hinder private property rights.  

Under current law, landlords may evict tenants for a specific reason, or for no reason at all, depending on the type of rental agreement. For tenancies with an ongoing, written agreement, landlords may give notice to evict for nonpayment of rent or for a specific reason, including violation of a provision of the lease. For tenants who are at-will, meaning those who do not have a written lease for a specific term, landlords may give notice to evict for failure to pay rent or for no reason.

Should the proposed Act pass, the new law would severely restrict the “no-fault eviction,” and limit evictions to instances where the tenant has not paid rent, created a nuisance, used the unit for an illegal purpose, violated the lease agreement, refused to extend or renew the lease, refused to permit the landlord to make necessary repairs, or offered subtenants not approved by the landlord. Exceptions to these restrictions have been offered, but are narrow in scope, applying to sober homes, college housing, or buildings owed by a Massachusetts resident who has six or less residential units. For larger scale, commercial landlords, they would be stuck with a tenant until a material issue arises.

Moreover, if passed, the Act would prevent landlords from clearing an entire building for the purpose of selling, renovating, or converting the use of the building. Under the new law, landlords would have to renovate a building or unit while the tenants continue to reside in their unit or force the landlord to provide alternative housing to the tenant while construction is ongoing.

If you are a landlord renting residential units in Boston, make sure you continue to monitor the Jim Brooks Community Stabilization Act. If it becomes law, your ability to remove tenants from a unit may become dramatically restricted. Should you have questions about evicting a residential tenant, you should contact a Boston property management attorney.